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Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting
I. INTRODUCTION
Classification shifting is an earnings management strategy whereby managers move items
within the income statement to improve core earnings (McVay, 2006). Literature has also
provided evidence of accruals earnings management (hereafter AEM; Healy, 1985; McNichols
and Wilson, 1988; Jones, 1991) and real earnings management (hereafter REM; Roychowdhury,
2006; Zang, 2012). Often, managers have the capacity to use all three forms of earnings
management to meet earnings targets, but may make trade-off decisions among the different
methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. Extant research (e.g., Ewert
and Wagenhofer, 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012) suggests when one
form of earnings management is constrained, or more costly, managers use alternative forms of
earnings management to achieve reporting objectives. However, literature has not investigated
the interaction of all three forms of earnings management together to consider tradeoffs between
earnings management techniques based upon the constraints and timing of each method. This
study examines how previously identified earnings management constraints are associated with
the use of classification shifting to manage earnings.
Understanding the use of classification shifting when other earnings management
strategies are constrained is important because of recent concerns regarding classification
shifting. Specifically, Haw et al. (2011) suggests that earnings management through
classification shifting can serve to undermine the credibility of financial statements by
misleading investors about the persistence of firms’ performance, which is critical to wellfunctioning capital markets. Toward that end, Alfonso et al. (2013) find that the market
overprices core earnings reported by classification shifters. In addition, the Securities and
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Exchange Commission (SEC) has explicitly indicated that the issue of classification shifting is
important by stating, “The appropriate classification of amounts within the income statement is
as important as the appropriate measurement or recognition of such amounts” (SEC, 2000).
Additionally, the SEC has been actively pursuing companies that engage in income classification
shifting. Dell, Inc., Symbol Technologies, Inc., and SafeNet, Inc. are examples of companies that
have been charged by the SEC with improper classification of ordinary operating expenses as
non-recurring expenses.
Classification shifting has also received attention on an international level because firms
often have greater discretion over classification of revenues and expenses under International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Shirato and Nagata, 2012).1 For example, Haw et al.
(2011) show that expense misclassification is prevalent and economically significant in East
Asian countries, while Shirato and Nagata (2012) provide evidence that Japanese firms
opportunistically shift revenues and expenses to increase core earnings. Further, there has been a
great deal of discussion about the practice of classification shifting by United Kingdom (U.K.)
firms (Athanasakou et al., 2011). For example, Athanasakou et al. (2009) provide evidence
suggesting that large U.K. firms engage in classification shifting of small core expenses to other
non-recurring items to meet analyst forecasts. Such international attention on classification
shifting further underscores the importance and relevance of our study. Understanding the costs
and constraints of REM and AEM and the corresponding effect on firms’ use of classification
shifting is pertinent for both United States (U.S.) and international firms.

1

International Accounting Standards (IAS) 1, Presentation of Financial Statements, requires a clear distinction
between core and exceptional income components, allowing firms to disclose material items of an exceptional
nature separately on the income statement. This allows managers to exercise discretion in classifying non-recurring
items.
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Zang (2012) investigates the trade-off between REM and AEM. She provides evidence
that managers use the two forms of earnings management as substitutes. We extend Zang (2012)
by first examining the trade-off between classification shifting and REM constraints (i.e., higher
tax rates, poorer financial condition, higher institutional ownership and lower industry market
share). Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of classification shifting is associated
with effective tax rates, percentage of institutional ownership, financial condition, and market
share within an industry.
We also examine the trade-off between classification shifting and AEM constraints. An
unintended consequence of the increased attention given to AEM by auditors and regulators may
be the increased use of classification shifting as an earnings management strategy. For example,
Fan et al. (2010) provides evidence that classification shifting is more prevalent for fiscal yearend reporting than for interim reporting. A possible explanation is that managers resort to
classification shifting because AEM is more constrained by the auditor at year-end than in the
interim reporting periods, which are unaudited. Therefore, we investigate the constraints
associated with AEM documented in prior literature (McInnis and Collins, 2011; Zang, 2012) to
examine their effect on classification shifting. We extend Fan et al. (2010) by addressing
constraints to AEM identified in prior literature while also including REM constraints.
Specifically, we examine whether firms are more likely to use classification shifting when
constrained from AEM by a Big N auditor, a long-tenured auditor, operating in the post-SOX
environment, less accounting flexibility, as proxied by high levels of net operating assets and
shorter operating cycles, and analyst cash flow forecasts.
Finally, we investigate the trade-off among REM, AEM, and classification shifting based
on the timing of each earnings management strategy. The timing of each earnings manipulation
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method is quite distinct. REM must occur during the fiscal year, while AEM occurs after the end
of the accounting period but within the confines of the accounting system. Classification shifting,
on the other hand, provides a flexible earnings management strategy because it is done outside of
the accounting system and is likely one of the last earnings management strategies available to
meet earnings targets. As a result, the timing of the strategy is an important factor in the decision
made by management. That is, managers can offset overly impactful REM and AEM by using
classification shifting.
We use logistic regression analysis to investigate the relations between classification
shifting and both REM and AEM. We measure REM using the methodology employed by
Roychowdhury (2006). Our results first show that when REM is constrained by poor financial
condition, high percentage of institutional ownership, and low industry market share, managers
are more likely to use classification shifting. We also document a positive association between
classification shifting and constraints to AEM from low accounting system flexibility (i.e., high
net operating assets) and the provision of an analyst cash flow forecast. In addition, when we
reduce our sample to firms that are most likely to manipulate earnings (suspect firms); we
continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM. Similar to Zang (2012) and
Athanasakou et al. (2011), we identify firms most likely to manipulate earnings (suspect sample)
as those firms that meet one of the following three criteria: 1) met analyst annual earnings per
share forecast by two cents or less, 2) Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) reported
positive earnings less than two cents per share, or 3) change from prior year IBES earnings was
an increase of less than two cents per share. Together, the results shed light on the potential
consequences of increased constraints to REM and AEM. That is, when firms are inhibited from
using REM and AEM they may be more likely to use classification shifting to manage earnings.
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Finally, our results provide evidence suggesting managers make trade-off decisions
among the three forms of earnings management. We document a negative and significant relation
between classification shifting and the level of unexpected REM and AEM. The results are
consistent with managers using classification shifting as a substitute for both REM and AEM.
We also document negative relations between classification shifting and the level of predicted
REM and predicted AEM. Zang (2012) provides evidence of a positive relation between
predicted REM and AEM which suggests managers may at times use REM and AEM jointly to
manage earnings. Our results indicate managers are not likely to use classification shifting jointly
to manage earnings with REM or AEM, but rather classification shifting is a substitute for both
REM and AEM.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, while prior studies have investigated
the relation between REM and AEM (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012) as well as AEM and
classification shifting (Fan et al., 2010), there is little research that investigates the tradeoff
between REM and classification shifting. Athanasakou et al. (2011) investigate REM, AEM and
classification shifting by U.K. firms to meet analyst expectations. Their research highlights the
importance of concurrently considering multiple strategies. Therefore, we extend prior research
by investigating three manipulation strategies based upon the associated costs, constraints, and
timing of each strategy. Second, our findings support a substitute relation between classification
shifting and REM. Third, we provide support for a similar relation between classification shifting
and REM, while prior research documents a substitute relation between AEM and REM (Zang,
2012).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related
research and Section III develops the hypotheses. Section IV describes the sample selection
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process and details our research methodology. Section V presents our results, while Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Three main forms of earnings management have been addressed in literature: accruals
earnings management (AEM), real earnings management (REM), and classification shifting.
Research on earnings management has historically focused on AEM. Evidence of AEM has been
documented in several contexts, using various different accruals, and in response to many
managerial incentives.2 AEM occurs when managers, through the use of discretionary accruals,
“borrow” earnings from future periods to increase current period earnings or conversely, push
earnings from the current period to future periods in order to decrease current period earnings.
Therefore, the cost of AEM used to increase current earnings, in addition to the cost of detection,
is a one-to-one reduction of future earnings. Future period earnings are lowered mechanically as
a result of the net income that is accelerated to the current period. Management’s decision to use
AEM should ensure that the benefits of using AEM to manage earnings exceed the associated
costs and constraints.
Another earnings management method investigated in literature is real earnings
management (REM). REM occurs when managers deviate from optimal business decisions with
real activities (i.e., overproducing to lower cost of goods sold (COGS), cutting discretionary
expenses such as research and development (R&D), etc.) to meet earnings targets. Initial REM
research focused on the manipulation of R&D expenditures to improve current operating results
(e.g., Baber et al., 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 1998).The motivation to study REM
was underscored by Graham et al.’s (2005) survey of company executives, who confirmed their
willingness to engage in different forms of earning manipulation to meet earnings targets.
2

See Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Dechow et al. (2010) for literature reviews of AEM and earnings quality.
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Consistent with these results, Roychowdhury (2006) provides empirical support that managers
avoid reporting losses or missing analyst forecasts through the manipulation of real activities.
Specifically, his study provides evidence that managers manipulate sales, reduce discretionary
expenditures, and overproduce inventory to decrease COGS. Other types of REM include the
sale of profitable assets (Bartov, 1993; Herrmann et al., 2003), sales price reductions (Jackson
and Wilcox, 2000), derivative hedging (Barton, 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002), stock
repurchases (Hribar et al., 2006), securitizations (Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009), and cutting
advertising expenditures (Cohen et al., 2010).
The manipulation of real activities by management can increase income, but it may not
occur without cost. For example, if management cuts R&D expenditures to improve current year
net income, the future firm performance may be hurt because of the lost opportunities from
decreased R&D. However, the manipulation of real activities by management is not a Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) violation, merely a questionable business decision.
Therefore, the cost of detection associated with REM is lower than AEM (McVay, 2006). Cohen
et al. (2008) show a decrease in AEM and an increase in REM following the passage of SOX.
Their results provide support for an increase in REM when AEM is constrained or the cost of
detection is more significant. However, the cost of detection is not the only cost associated with
both forms of earnings management. In a recent study, Zang (2012) investigates the trade-off
decision faced by managers between using AEM and REM. Her study demonstrates that firms
decide between the two earnings management strategies based on the relative costs or constraints
of each strategy. As a result, AEM and REM are substitutes (Zang, 2012).
A third type of earnings management addressed in literature is classification shifting.
Classification shifting refers to misclassifying items within the income statement while net
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income remains unchanged (McVay, 2006).3 For example, classification shifting includes
shifting expenses from operating expense to non-recurring expenses in order to increase core
earnings. McVay (2006) provides support for classification shifting between operating expenses
and special items. While the misclassification of items on the income statement may appear
innocuous because net income remains unchanged, the different income statement line items are
informative to financial statement users. Permanent line items are closer to the top of the income
statement which indicates a higher likelihood of persisting in the future (e.g., Lipe, 1986;
Fairfield et al., 1996). Conversely, transient income statement line items; that is, line items that
are less likely to continue in the future, are closer to the bottom of the income statement (e.g.,
Burgstahler et al., 2002). Therefore, classification shifting misrepresents the persistence of line
items within the income statement and, as a result, could mislead investors regarding the future
performance of the firm.
Recent research on classification shifting suggests that firms engage in classification
shifting by moving operating expenses to income-decreasing discontinued operations in order to
increase core earnings (Barua et al., 2010). Using a U.S. sample of firms, McVay (2006) finds
classification shifting is more pervasive when it allows firms to meet or exceed analyst forecasts.
Fan et al. (2010) provides support that classification shifting is more prominent in the fourth
quarter and that managers are more likely to use classification shifting when they are constrained
from using AEM. Further, Athanasakou et al. (2009) provide evidence that U.K. firms use
classification shifting as a primary means to achieve analyst targets.

3

While classification shifting has received more attention recently in academia, earlier research also suggests that
managers use classification shifting (e.g., Barnea et al., 1976; Beattie et al., 1994). Kinney and Trezevant (1997)
documented that managers manipulated the presentation of the income statement (without actually misclassifying
expenses) in order to influence the perception of a firm’s performance.
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Prior research provides evidence that firms switch from AEM to REM when their ability
to engage in AEM is constrained. For example, Cohen et al. (2008) provide evidence that firms
switched from AEM to REM subsequent to the passage of SOX, which placed regulatory
emphasis on AEM. Similarly, Chi et al. (2011) find that firms audited by high quality auditors
are more likely to engage in REM because their ability to manipulate accruals is constrained.
Furthermore, Badertscher (2011) finds that overvalued firms move from AEM to REM as they
run out of accruals management options in order to sustain their overvalued equity, while Cohen
and Zarowin (2010) find that firms choose to engage in REM around the time of seasoned equity
offerings based on the costs related to AEM. Zang (2012) provides further evidence that
managers use the AEM and REM as substitutes. She finds that the trade-off decision is based on
the relative costliness of each earnings management strategy. In addition, Zang (2012) suggests
that managers adjust the level of AEM according to the realized level of REM. While the above
studies document a trade-off between REM and AEM, to our knowledge, no other study
examines the trade-off between REM and classification shifting while considering associated
constraints.
In addition, earnings management research has recently begun to investigate all three
forms of earnings management together. For example, Athanasakou et al. (2011) investigate the
market response to meeting analyst earnings expectations associated with earnings management
(AEM, REM and classification shifting) and earnings forecast guidance strategies. They find that
firms that use classification shifting to meet analyst expectations receive a lower market reward
than do firms that genuinely meet or beat the earnings target. Their study highlights that there are
three earning management techniques available to managers to manipulate earnings, and all three
should be considered by researchers and regulators. While there has been an increase in
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classification shifting research recently, prior studies have not investigated the trade-off decision
faced by management among all three forms of earnings management while considering
associated constraints.
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
To address our research question of how the costs, constraints, and timing of REM and
AEM are associated with the use of classification shifting, we first hypothesize the relation
between REM constraints and classification shifting. Next, we present our hypotheses regarding
the relation between AEM constraints and classification shifting. Finally, we hypothesize the
association among all three forms of earnings management (i.e., REM, AEM, and classification
shifting) by considering the timing of managers’ trade-off decisions.
Managers have at their disposal different forms of earnings management (i.e., REM,
AEM, classification shifting) that they can implement to help achieve desired goals. The
associated costs and constraints of a particular earnings management strategy may cause a
manager to resort to another form of earnings management. Therefore, when REM is
constrained, managers may be more likely to use classification shifting to manage earnings. The
relative costliness of each earnings management method is likely determined by the firm’s
operating and accounting environment. As a result, we investigate four constraints of REM to
examine their impact on managers’ decision to use classification shifting: higher effective tax
rates, poorer financial condition, higher percentage of institutional ownership, and lower industry
market share.
Specifically, prior research shows that REM is costly based on tax constraints (Zang,
2012). When firms increase book income by cutting discretionary expenditures or by overproducing inventory, they also increase taxable income and incur higher tax costs in the current
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period. In contrast, classification shifting increases core earnings without tax consequences.
Based on the greater tax costs associated with REM, firms with higher effective tax rates should
be more likely to resort to classification shifting. This leads to the following prediction:
H1a: Other things being equal, firms with higher effective tax rates have a greater
likelihood of classification shifting.
Another constraint to REM is poor financial health. For firms in financial distress, the
marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies is likely to be high. In this case,
managers might perceive REM as relatively costly because their primary goal is to survive and
improve operations. In Graham et al. (2005), Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) admit that if the
company is in a “negative tailspin,” they are more concerned about performance than financial
reporting. Conversely, firms in poor financial health may cut discretionary spending due to
liquidity concerns, which would reduce the need to classification shift. Therefore, we present the
following hypothesis in the null form:
H1b: Other things being equal, firms with poorer financial health are not associated with
the likelihood of classification shifting.
Prior studies suggest that institutional investors, as a monitoring mechanism, act to
reduce REM. For example, Bushee (1998) finds that firms are less likely to cut R&D expenditure
to avoid a decline in earnings when institutional ownership is high. Further,
Roychowdhury (2006) finds a negative relation between institutional ownership and the use of
REM to avoid losses. This research supports the notion that institutional investors, who are more
sophisticated and informed than other investors, have a better understanding of the long-term
implication of firms’ real operating activities, leading to more effort to monitor and mitigate
REM. Classification shifting could potentially increase as an indirect consequence of this
reduced REM. However, institutional investors may also be able to monitor and mitigate the use
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of classification shifting. The institutional investors’ sophisticated knowledge of the industry, the
company, and the company’s financial statements suggests they may be able to recognize and
mitigate classification shifting. Accordingly, we present the following hypothesis in the null
form:
H1c: Other things being equal, firms with higher institutional ownership are not
associated with the likelihood of classification shifting.
Finally, since REM is a departure from optimal operational decisions, it can be
particularly costly for firms that face intense competition in the industry (Zang, 2012). Therefore,
managers in firms who have a lower percentage of industry market share may perceive REM as
more costly because it can further erode their status within the industry. We therefore predict the
following:
H1d: Other things being equal, firms with lower industry market share have a greater
likelihood of classification shifting.
Our second set of hypotheses investigates the use of classification shifting when AEM is
constrained. If firms are constrained from using AEM, they may resort to using classification
shifting for their earnings management strategy. Fan et al. (2010) find that classification shifting
increases when AEM is constrained by optimistic reporting in previous periods. We extend Fan
et al. (2010) by investigating the trade-off between AEM and classification shifting after
controlling for REM constraints. In addition, Zang (2012) provides evidence that the costs and
constraints of each strategy lead to the trade-off between AEM and REM. We extend her study
by addressing the costs and constraints of AEM on firms’ propensity to use classification shifting
to manage earnings. Therefore, we investigate the effect of five AEM constraints on managers’
use of classification shifting to manage earnings: Big N auditor, long-tenured auditor, operating
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in a post-SOX environment, less accounting flexibility, and firms with an analyst cash flow
forecast.
Prior research provides evidence that Big N audit firms constrain AEM (e.g., DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1991, 1993; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012).
Additionally, because audits are generally balance sheet focused, an increase in audit quality
focused on the balance sheet may lead to increased management of income statement
classifications, an area that is of less audit focus, to meet earnings targets (Bell et al., 1997).
Increased audit effort focused on the balance sheet may constrain managers’ earnings
management choices which could increase the motive for managers to resort to classification
shifting on the income statement. Additionally, since classification shifting does not alter the
bottom line GAAP earnings it may be subject to less scrutiny by auditors (Nelson et al., 2002).
However, it is also possible that Big N auditors may directly decrease classification shifting. If
Big N auditors increase the overall quality of an audit, then it is likely Big N auditors would have
a greater likelihood of discovering and mitigating the use of classification shifting. Accordingly,
we formulate the following hypothesis in the null form:
H2a: Other things being equal, firms audited by Big N audit firms are not associated
with the likelihood of classification shifting.
Similarly, Myers et al. (2003) document a significant and negative relation between AEM
and auditor tenure after controlling for auditor type (Big 8 versus non-Big 8). They suggest that,
on average, auditors place greater constraints on AEM as their relationship with the client
lengthens. Based upon our previous discussion, we expect that as AEM is constrained, firms
resort to more classification shifting. However, if auditors, through increased exposure to their
client, become more knowledgeable about appropriate income statement classifications, then
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audit tenure may also decrease classification shifting. Therefore, we present the following
hypothesis in the null form:
H2b: Other things being equal, firms with longer auditor tenure are not associated with
the likelihood of classification shifting.
Further, according to Cohen et al. (2008), AEM decreased after implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This suggests that the increased regulation results in higher costs of
AEM.4 Faced with these higher costs, managers may resort to alternative forms of earnings
management. However, SOX also directly affected pro-forma reporting (Heflin and Hsu, 2008).
Therefore, to the extent SOX increased the scrutiny of classificatory choices; the likelihood of
detecting classification shifting is potentially higher post-SOX. Accordingly, we formulate the
following hypothesis in the null form:
H2c: Other things being equal, firms in the post-SOX period have no association with
the likelihood of classification shifting.
In addition to auditors and regulation, AEM is affected by accounting system flexibility
(Zang, 2012). If firms have accounting systems that lack flexibility, they are less able to engage
in AEM and focus on earnings management outside the confines of the accounting system.
Classification shifting is implemented outside of the accounting system and therefore, may be a
less costly option for managers. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows:
H2d: Other things being equal, firms with lower flexibility in their accounting system
have a greater likelihood of classification shifting.
The final constraint to AEM we investigate is the presence of a cash flow forecast.
McInnis and Collins (2011) provide evidence that AEM declines following the provision of a
cash flow forecast by analysts. The issuance of the cash flow forecast, in addition to the earnings
4

Regulation Fair Disclsoure (Reg FD) became effective in 2000 and regulated the ability of companies to
disseminate information to analysts (Gintschel and Markov, 2004). This increase in regulation in 2000, along with
other regulation, could potentially confound the results of our test which focuses specifically on SOX regulation. We
address this in the next section.
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forecast, implicitly provides a forecast of operating accruals. According to McInnis and Collins
(2011), the cash flow forecast increases the transparency and associated costs of AEM. As a
result, managers may be more likely to use classification shifting to manage earnings. Therefore,
we hypothesize the following:
H2e: Other things being equal, firms with an analyst cash flow forecast have a greater
likelihood of classification shifting.
An important variation among earnings management strategies is the timing of when the
different forms of manipulation are implemented by management. Bhojraj et al. (2009) and Zang
(2012) highlight the importance of the timing of the earnings management strategies. The timing
has an influence on which earnings management method is used by management. REM occurs
within the period based on the nature of the manipulation. AEM happens after the end of the
period but within the confines of the accounting system (i.e. before a company closes its books).
However, classification shifting occurs after the end of the period but before the earnings
announcement (McVay, 2006). Therefore, classification shifting can be used to complement
REM and AEM to meet earnings targets, or to offset an overly impactful REM or AEM.
The third set of hypotheses addresses directly the effect of the timing difference on
management’s trade-off decision among the three forms of earnings management. As discussed
previously, the timing of earnings management strategies is likely to be as follows: first, REM;
second, AEM; and finally, classification shifting.5 Therefore, the timing of each earnings
management strategy is potentially a key factor in determining its use by management. Zang
(2012) provides support for the effect of the timing difference on management’s trade-off
decision between REM and AEM and suggests the two forms of earnings management are

5

The decision to use AEM or classification shifting is likely jointly determined subsequent to REM, which must be
done within the accounting period.
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substitutes. We extend Zang (2012) by investigating the relation between classification shifting
and REM and also the relation between classification shifting and AEM.
REM occurs during the period because of the nature of the manipulation. However, the
effect of REM cannot be precisely determined by management as it occurs. Therefore, if REM
turns out to be unexpectedly high (low), managers may decrease (increase) the extent of both
AEM and classification shifting. Therefore, we predict a negative relation between classification
shifting and REM. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3a: Other things being equal, the likelihood of classification shifting is negatively
related to the unexpected amount of real earnings management.
REM occurs during the period and therefore is based on an estimate of the “necessary”
earnings management. Both AEM and classification shifting occur after period-end when the
“necessary” earnings management is more accurately known. As a result, if management chooses
to use AEM to manipulate earnings, then management will be less likely to use classification
shifting. Our final hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3b: Other things being equal, the likelihood of classification shifting is negatively
related to the unexpected amount of accruals earnings management.
IV. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODOLGY
Data and Sample Selection
We obtain data for the years 1988 to 2011 from the annual Compustat North America
Fundamental Industrial Annual File, CRSP, IBES and Thomson Reuters databases. Consistent
with prior research; we exclude financial firms and utilities (Athanasakou et al., 2011). Each
firm-year observation is required to have sufficient data to calculate variables in our models.
Following McVay (2006) we eliminate firm-year observations from the sample for the following
reasons: 1) annual sales less than $1 million, 2) change in fiscal year-end during the year, or 3)
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less than 15 observations within the industry-year. We base our industry classifications on Fama
and French (1997). The full sample consists of 33,619 firm-year observations.
To further examine managers’ trade-off decisions among classification shifting, REM,
and AEM, we investigate a sample of earnings management suspect firms where the firms are in
a setting with more incentive to manage earnings. That is, this sample focuses our tests on the
trade-off decision among the three earnings management activities, rather than whether or not to
engage in earnings management. Based on prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012)
that assumes earnings management is likely to have occurred when reported earnings just met
earnings benchmarks, we examine our hypotheses for a subsample of firms (suspect sample) that
meets one of the following three criteria: 1) met analyst annual earnings per share forecast by
two cents or less, 2) IBES reported positive earnings less than two cents per share, or 3) change
from prior year IBES earnings was an increase of less than two cents per share. The suspect
sample consists of 7,638 firm-year observations. Table 1 lists the variable definitions used in our
analyses with Compustat codes.
Insert Table 1 Here
Research Methodology
We first estimate core earnings for each firm in our sample. Expected core earnings is
predicted for each firm based on the McVay (2006) model.6 The following model is estimated
for each industry-year:
CEt = β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3WCAt-1 + β4WCAt + β5∆SALESt
+ β6NEG_∆SALESt + εt

(1)

where CEt is core earnings (sales minus both COGS and selling, general and administrative
expenses) scaled by sales, ATOt is asset turnover ratio, WCA is working capital accruals (change
6

Consistent with Athanasakou et al. (2011), we replace current and prior year accruals with current and prior year
working capital accruals (WCA).
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in total current assets net of change in cash, minus change in current liabilities net of change in
the current portion of long-term debt) scaled by total assets, ∆SALESt is the percentage change in
sales and ∆NEG_SALESt is the percentage change in sales when the sales change is negative to
allow for different slope coefficients for sales increases and decreases.
Next, unexpected core earnings (UnCEt) is determined for each firm-year by subtracting
the predicted core earnings from the estimation of equation (1) from the actual core earnings
reported. We follow the methodology of Athanasakou et al. (2011) and classify firms as
classification shifting firms (CS = 1) if their UnCE is positive and IBES earnings per share is
greater than GAAP net income per share. We follow Zang (2012) in the constraints to REM,
AEM and control variables we include in the model. We use the following logit model of the
probability that a firm is a classification shifting firm based on the constraints to REM and AEM,
respectively:
(Prob CSt=1) = α0 + α1TaxRatet-1 + α2Zscoret-1 + α3InstHoldingst-1
+ α4MarketSharet-1 + α5BigNt + α6LongTenuret + α7SOXt
+ α8HighNOAt + α9OpCyclet-1 +α10CFO_Forecastt
+ α11LogAssetst-1+α12ROAt-1+ α13MtBt
+ α14Inverse_Millst + εt

(2)

The first set of hypotheses (H1a-H1d) investigates the relation between REM and
classification shifting. TaxRatet, our proxy for firms’ effective tax rates, is calculated by dividing
total taxes paid by pre-tax income.7 Based on H1a, we expect a positive and significant
Zscoret is the proxy used for firms’ financial health and is measured as the modified version
of Z-Score (Altman, 1968, 2000); lower values of Zscoret represent poorer financial health.
InstHoldingst is the percent of institutional ownership, calculated as the number of shares held by
institutions divided by total shares outstanding. Statistically significant coefficient estimates for

7

TaxRatet is constrained to be within of 0 to 100 percent of pre-tax income.
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orreject the null hypotheses of H1b and H1c, respectively. Finally, MarketSharet is
measured as a firm’s percentage of industry sales and is calculated by dividing the firm’s lagged
sales total by the lagged industry (three-digit SIC code) sales total. A negative and significant
coefficient on MarketSharet provides support for H1d.
The second set of hypotheses (H2a-H2e) investigates the constraints to AEM and how
those constraints affect classification shifting. BigNt is an indicator variable that takes the value
of one if the firm is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and zero otherwise, while
LongTenuret is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has retained the auditor longer
than the sample median of eight years, and zero otherwise (Zang 2012). We create an indicator
variable (SOXt) that takes the value of one if the fiscal year is after 2003, and zero otherwise.8
Statistically significant coefficient estimates for 5, 6 or 7, reject the null hypotheses of H2a,
H2b and H2c, respectively.
We include two proxies for the flexibility of a firm’s accounting system, HighNOAt and
OpCyclet. Consistent with Zang (2012) and Fan et al. (2010), HighNOAt is an indicator variable
that equals one if the net operating assets (NOA) at the beginning of the year divided by lagged
sales is above the median of the corresponding industry-year, and zero otherwise.9 The length of
a firm’s operating cycle is the second proxy for accounting flexibility. OpCyclet is measured as
days receivable plus the days in inventory at the beginning of the year, which is consistent with

8

Another major regulatory change occurred in October 2000, with the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Reg FD), which prohibits firms from privately disclosing information to select audiences. We also analyze the
tradeoff decision that managers face in the pre– and post–Reg FD periods. Our primary results are similar when we
use Reg FD rather than SOX.
9
Zang (2012) suggests that managers’ capacity to manage accruals upward in the current period is constrained by
accruals manipulation in previous periods. We use net operating assets (NOA) at the beginning of the year as a
proxy for the extent of AEM in the previous periods (Barton and Simko, 2002). NOA is measured as shareholder’s
equity less cash and marketable securities plus total debt and minority interests (Hirshleifer et al., 2004; McVay,
2006).
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Zang (2012).10 A positive (negative) and significant 8 (9) is consistent with H2d. We create an
indicator variable (CFO_Forecastt) that takes the value of one if the firm has a cash flow
forecast in IBES, and zero otherwise. Finally, we expect 10 to be positive and significant which
is consistent with H2e.
Control variables are also included in the model. LogAssetst-1 (calculated as the log value
of lagged total assets) is included to control for relative firm size. ROAt-1, computed as net
income divided by total assets, provides a control for firm performance. Market-to-book ratio
(MtBt), measured as the log of market value of equity divided by book value of equity, is also
included to control for firms’ growth rates. Finally, the model includes both industry and year
fixed effects. We estimate the model using both the full and the suspect samples. For the suspect
sample, we include the inverse Mills ratio (Inverse_Millst) to control for potential sample
selection bias.11 We use independent variables from prior research that suggests capital market
incentives dominate other incentives for meeting or beating earnings targets (Zang, 2012).
In the third set of hypotheses (H3a and H3b), we investigate the relation among the three
forms of earnings management. We test the hypotheses by investigating the relation between
classification shifting and unexpected REM and between classification shifting and unexpected
AEM. First, we calculate the proxy for REM. Consistent with Zang (2012), our proxy for REM
(REMt) is the combined residuals from the following equations for discretionary expenses
(decreases with REM) and production costs (increases with REM) (Roychowdhury, 2006):
DISEXPt = β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(Salest /ATt-1) + εt

(3)

PRODt = β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(Salest /ATt-1) + β3(∆Salest /ATt-1)
+ β4(∆Salest-1 /ATt-1) +εt

(4)

10

Longer operating cycles provide firms with more flexibility in accruals because the accruals accounts are larger
and the length of time for reversal of accruals is longer (Zang 2012).
11
See Table 1 for the selection model.
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where DISEXPt is discretionary expenditures (i.e., the sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A
expenditures) in year t, scaled by lagged assets; Salest is net sales in year t; and PRODt is the
sum of COGS in year t plus the change in inventory from t-1 to t, all scaled by lagged assets. In
order to create one measure of REM, the residuals from equation (3) are multiplied by negative
one so that higher values indicate greater amounts of discretionary expenditure reduction by
firms to increase earnings. Finally, the negative residual from equation (3) is added with the
residual from equation (4) to create one proxy for REM (REMt) (Zang, 2012).
Next, we calculate the proxy for AEM. Our proxy for accruals earnings management
(AEMt) is the estimated residuals from the following modified Jones (1991) model:
Accrualst/ATt-1 = β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(∆AdjustedSalest/ATt-1)
+ β3(PPEt/ATt-1) + β4(OpInct/ATt-1) + β5(OpCFt/ATt-1)
+ β6NegOpCFt + β7(OpCFt/ATt-1)*NegOpCFt +εt

(5)

where Accrualst is the earnings before extraordinary items minus the cash flows from operations
reported in the statement of cash flows in year t; ATt-1 is the total assets in year t-1;
∆AdjustedSalest is the change in net sales from t-1 to t less the change in accounts receivable
from t-1 to t; and PPEt is the gross property, plant and equipment at year t; OpInct is operating
income before depreciation; OpCFt is the change in cash flows from operations reported in the
statement of cash flows from year t-1 to t; NegOpCFt is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if OpCFt is less than zero.
Finally, we calculate unexpected REM (UnREMt) and unexpected AEM (UnAEMt) as the
residuals from the following two equations, respectively:
REMt = β0 + β1TaxRatet-1 + β2Zscoret-1 + β3InstHoldingst-1 + β4MarketSharet-1
+ β5BigNt + β6LongTenuret + β7HighNOAt + β8OpCyclet-1
+ β9CFO_Forecastt + β10LogAssetst-1 + β11ROAt-1 + β12MtBt + β13Earnt
+ β14Inverse_Millst + εt
AEMt = β0 + β1TaxRatet-1 + β2Zscoret-1 + β3InstHoldingst-1 + β4MarketSharet-1
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(6)

+ β5BigNt + β6LongTenuret + β7HighNOAt + β8OpCyclet-1 + β9CFO_Forecastt
+ β10LogAssetst-1 + β11ROAt-1 + β12MtBt + β13UnREMt + β14PredREMt
+ β15Inverse_Millst + εt
(7)
Each model includes earnings management constraint variables for both REM and
AEM.12 We also include control variables: LogAssetst-1, ROAt-1, MtBt and Inverse_Millst.
Consistent with Zang (2012), in equation (6), we include pre-managed earnings (Earnt) to
control for the goal of managing earnings. Earn is measured as the earnings before extraordinary
items, minus discretionary accruals and production costs, plus discretionary expenditures. In
equation (7), Earnt is replaced by unexpected (UnREMt) and predicted (PredREMt) REM, which
are determined from the estimation of equation (6).
The third set of hypotheses is tested by adding the variables UnREMt and UnAEMt to
model (2) above as follows:
(Prob CSt=1) =α0 + α1UnREMt + α2UnAEMt + α3TaxRatet-1 + α4Zscoret-1
+ α5InstHoldingst-1 + α6MarketSharet-1 + α7BigNt + α8LongTenuret
+ α9SOXt + α10HighNOAt + α11OpCyclet-1 + α12CFO_Forecastt
+ α13LogAssetst-1 + α14ROAt-1 + α15MtBt + α16PredREMt
+ α17PredAEMt + α18Inverse_Millst + εt
(8)
A negative and significant coefficient on α1 and α2 provide support for H3a and H3b,
respectively.
V. RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The
descriptive statistics are for the full sample of firms, which includes 33,619 firm year
observations from 1988-2011. Twenty-one percent of our sample firms are classified as
classification shifters (CS= 0.210), which is the dependent variable for our primary tests
tabulated on Tables 4 and 5. Eighty-eight percent of the sample was audited by Big N public

12

We exclude SOX from both equations because the models are estimated by industry-year.
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accounting firms (BigN = 0.880) and nearly half of the firm year observations occurred during
the Post-SOX era (SOX = 0.497). The average length of the operating cycle (OpCycle) is 128.362
days. Finally, the average size (LogAssets) of the full sample is 6.138. The descriptive statistics
for the suspect sample are similar in size and distribution to the full sample and are therefore
excluded for brevity.13 The suspect sample includes 7,638 firm year observations that: 1) met
analyst annual earnings per share forecast by two cents or less, 2) IBES reported positive
earnings less than two cents per share, or 3) change from prior year IBES earnings was increase
of less than two cents per share.
Insert Table 2 Here
Prior to implementing the multivariate regression analysis, we examine the Pearson
correlations among the variables used in the regression analysis. The correlation matrix for the
full sample is reported in Table 3; the correlation matrix for the suspect sample is quite similar
and therefore not tabulated for brevity. Significant correlation coefficients are shown in bold.
The positive and significant correlation coefficient (0.458) between CFO_Forecast and SOX
suggests firms are more likely to issue a cash flow forecast subsequent to SOX. The positive and
significant correlation coefficient (0.405) between LogAssets and MarketShare is consistent with
larger firms having a greater industry market share. The positive and significant correlation
coefficient (0.544) between LogAssets and CFO_Forecast indicates larger firms are more likely
to issue a cash flow forecast. Finally, the negative and significant correlation coefficient (-0.407)
between PredREM and MtB suggests growth firms are less likely to use REM to manage
earnings. The correlation statistics indicate that the correlation coefficients are not large enough
to prohibit the use of a multivariate regression analysis.

13

In addition, the descriptive statistics for our full sample and suspect sample are similar in size and distribution to
prior research (McVay 2006; Zang, 2012).
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Insert Table 3 Here
The results from our multivariate analyses used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 are presented
in Table 4. Our first set of hypotheses (H1a – H1d) examines constraints associated with the
trade-off decision made by management to manipulate earnings. Column 1 of Table 4 presents
the results from estimating equation (2) for the full sample of firms. The coefficient of -0.0581
on TaxRate is not significant at conventional levels (z=-0.65) which fails to provide support for
H1a. However, the negative and significant coefficient of 0.010 on Zscore (z=-3.38) suggests
that firms constrained from engaging in REM because of poor financial condition resort to
classification shifting, which rejects the null hypothesis for H1b of no association. The
coefficient of 0.422 on InstHolding is positive and significant (z=6.61), which rejects the null
hypothesis of H1c and suggests that firms constrained from engaging in REM because of
monitoring from institutional investors are more likely to resort to classification shifting. This
also provides support for the long-term focus of sophisticated institutional investors suggesting
that they are concerned with the negative future implications of REM. Finally, the coefficient on
MarketShare is negative (-0.597) and significant (z=-3.77), which is consistent with our
prediction for H1d. Taken together, these results provide evidence of increased classification
shifting when REM is constrained for our full sample of firms. Specifically, when REM is
constrained by poor financial condition, higher scrutiny from institutional shareholders, and
lower industry market share, firms resort to classification shifting.
Insert Table 4 Here
Our second set of hypotheses (H2a – H2e) investigates the trade-off decision made
between AEM and classification shifting. The coefficient on BigN is not statistically significant
(z=1.19), which supports the null hypothesis of H2a. However, the coefficient on LongTenure is
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negative (-0.068) and statistically significant (z=-2.05), which rejects the null hypothesis of H2b.
These results suggest that while higher quality auditors may constrain AEM, this does not lead to
an increase in the use of classification shifting. In fact, our evidence suggests that longer auditor
tenure actually acts to constrain classification shifting.
We document an insignificant coefficient (z=0.031) on SOX, which suggests that
increased regulation surrounding financial reporting decreased managers’ capacity to use AEM
had no effect on firms use of classification shifting.14 The coefficient on HighNOA is positive
and statistically significant (coefficient=0.190; z=5.68). However, the coefficient on OpCycle is
not statistically different from zero (z=1.47). Therefore, we provide support for H2d for the full
sample of firms when HighNOA is used as a proxy for accounting system flexibility, but not
when using OpCycle. Finally, the coefficient on CFO_Forecast is positive and significant
(coefficient=0.177; z=4.19), which provides support for H2e. These results suggest that
managers use classification shifting as a substitute for AEM. Specifically, when AEM is
constrained by high NOA and the presence of a cash flow forecast, firms are more likely to use
classification shifting.
Column 2 of Table 4 presents the results from our multivariate analyses when we limit
the sample to firms that just met or beat an earnings benchmark (suspect sample). We test our
hypotheses using the suspect sample because it provides a setting where firms have greater
incentive to manage earnings and provides a more direct test of the trade-off among earnings
management strategies, rather than the decision of whether to engage in earnings management.
Therefore, we anticipate finding results consistent with the full sample. Consistent with results
from the full sample, the coefficient on TaxRate is not statistically significant (z=-0.40). The

14

As mentioned previously, the inability to reject the null hypothesis H2c may also be a result of the confounding
effects of other regulation that was effective before SOX (i.e., Reg FD).
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negative and significant coefficient of 0.012 on Zscore (z=-2.31) suggests that firms constrained
from engaging in REM because of poor financial condition resort to classification shifting. The
coefficient of 0.325 on InstHolding is positive and significant (z=2.32), while the coefficient on
MarketShare is negative and significant (coefficient -0.971; z=-3.09), which is consistent with
our expectations. Taken together, for our suspect sample, when REM is constrained by poor
financial condition, higher scrutiny from institutional shareholders, and lower industry market
share, firms resort to classification shifting. These results are similar to and consistent with
results from the full sample of firms.
Turning to our investigation into the trade-off decision made between AEM and
classification shifting for suspect firms, we find no significant coefficient on BigN (z=-0.83),
LongTenure (z=-1.24), or SOX (z=0.24). The results fail to reject the null hypotheses for H2a,
H2b, and H2c for our suspect sample. For the results of our investigation into accounting system
flexibility and classification shifting, the coefficient on HighNOA is positive (0.167) and
statistically significant (z=2.57), which is consistent with our results for the full sample of firms.
However, the coefficient on OpCycle is positive and statistically significant (coefficient=0.001;
z=2.07), which is opposite our expectations.15 Therefore, we continue to provide support for H2d
for our suspect sample when HighNOA is used to proxy for accounting system flexibility, but not
when using OpCycle. Finally, the coefficient on CFO_Forecast is positive and significant
(coefficient=0.175; z=2.08), which provides support for H2e for the suspect sample. Consistent
with results from the full sample of firms, the results for the suspect sample suggest that
managers are more likely to use classification shifting when AEM is constrained by high NOA
and the presence of a cash flow forecast.

15

Long operating cycles could indicate exhausted accounting flexibility. In this case, the association between
OpCycle and classification shifting may not be linear, which could explain this result.
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Unexpected REM and AEM
Table 5 presents the results from our multivariate analyses used to test H3. Column 1 of
Table 5 presents the results of equation (8) for the full sample of firms. The coefficient on
UnREM is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.266; z=-4.63) suggesting that firms with
unexpectedly high REM are less likely to engage in classification shifting. This result provides
support for H3a. Furthermore, the negative and significant coefficient of 1.751 on UnAEM (z=8.32) suggests that firms with unexpectedly high AEM are also less likely to resort to
classification shifting, which is consistent with H3b.
Insert Table 5 Here
Limiting our sample to only suspect firms produces similar results. Specifically, Column
2 of Table 5 presents the results from Equation (8) for our suspect sample. For the suspect
sample, the coefficient on UnREM is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.541; z=-3.64) and
the coefficient on UnAEM is -1.759 (z=-2.57) which provides further support that firms are less
likely to resort to classification shifting when REM and AEM are unexpectedly high.
In addition, the control variables PredREM and PredAEM are also included in Table 5.
The coefficients for both variables are negative and significant in both columns. Zang (2012)
finds a positive association between AEM and predicted REM which suggests the two forms of
earnings management are often used jointly to manage earnings. Zang (2012) also documents a
negative relation between unexpected REM and AEM which also suggests AEM is used by
management to offset overly impactful REM. Our results suggest a substitutive association
between classification shifting and the other two forms of earnings management (AEM and
REM). The negative coefficients on PredREM and PredAEM suggest firms likely use
classification shifting as a substitute for both AEM and REM. This is also supported by a
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negative relation between both UnREM and UnAEM, and classification shifting. Therefore, firms
are less likely to use classification shifting in conjunction with AEM and REM. This result is
intuitive in that classification shifting is a GAAP violation. Therefore, if firms can meet earnings
thresholds using earnings management techniques that do not violate GAAP, they will choose to
do so.
Together, the analysis suggests the importance of understanding the costs and constraints
of each form of earnings management. In particular, if the costs of AEM or REM are high,
managers may resort to using classification shifting to manage earnings. Our results provide
evidence supporting an increase in the use of classification shifting when REM is constrained by
poor financial condition, higher scrutiny from institutional shareholders, and lower industry
market share. The results suggest an increase in the attention placed on a firm’s optimal decision
making and long-term performance lead to an increase in classification shifting. These firms are
less likely to use REM which may result in a decrease in future operating performance. In
addition, we provide support for an increase in the use of classification shifting when AEM is
constrained by high NOA and the presence of a cash flow forecast. However, audit and
regulatory constraints do not appear to affect the use of classification shifting. These findings
suggest auditors and regulators potentially constrain both AEM and classification shifting.
Our results also suggest a substitute relation between classification shifting and the two
other forms of earnings management (AEM and REM). That is, managers that use REM and
AEM to manage earnings are less likely to use classification shifting. Therefore, a potential
unintended consequence of constraining REM and AEM could be an increase in the use of
classification shifting.
VI. CONCLUSION
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Prior literature has investigated three main forms of earnings manipulation: AEM, REM,
and classification shifting. However, the literature has not investigated all three earnings
management strategies simultaneously with cost and constraint considerations. An essential facet
of earnings management is the trade-off decision made by management between the different
strategies. It is important to understand why managers choose different earnings management
strategies. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine the costs, constraints, and
timing associated with REM and AEM and the corresponding effect on classification shifting.
In her study, Zang (2012) investigates the trade-off decision made by management
between AEM and REM based on the costs and constraints of each earnings management
strategy. She provides evidence that REM and AEM are substitutes for one another. However,
her study does not consider earnings management through classification shifting. We extend her
study by including classification shifting as an earnings management strategy. Such an
investigation into classification shifting is important because classification shifting can mislead
investors about firm performance and distort valuation (Alfonso et al., 2013).
Based on the relative constraints of the different earnings management strategies, we find
evidence consistent with increased use of classification shifting when REM is constrained.
Specifically, we show that when REM is constrained by poor financial performance, high
institutional ownership, and low industry market share, managers are more likely to resort to
classification shifting. Further, we hypothesize and find a positive relation between classification
shifting and specific costs of AEM including accounting system flexibility and analyst issuance
of cash flow forecasts. When the sample includes only firms that are most likely to manipulate
earnings (suspect firms), we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM
(poor financial health, high institutional ownership, low accounting system flexibility, and
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issuance of cash flow forecasts) leading to greater likelihood of classification shifting. Finally,
we examine the effect of the timing of the different earnings management strategies on the use of
classification shifting. Our results suggest firms use classification shifting as a substitute for both
REM and AEM.
Our study provides multiple contributions. First, we investigate the trade-off decision
managers make among earnings management strategies by investigating all three (AEM, REM,
and classification shifting) earnings management methods in our analysis. Second, our results
provide evidence that when managers are constrained from using REM, they are more likely to
use classification shifting to increase core earnings. Third, we find that when a firm's ability to
use accruals to manage earnings is constrained in certain settings, they turn to shifting items
within the income statement to increase core earnings. However, all AEM constraints do not
indirectly increase classification shifting; we do not find evidence of more classification shifting
for AEM constraints that are most directly related to improved financial reporting quality (i.e.,
Big N auditors, long tenured auditors and regulation). Finally, our results provide support for a
substitute relation between both REM and AEM, and classification shifting. The findings of this
study should be of interest to accounting standards-setting bodies, auditors, and investors,
because they highlight the importance of an awareness of classification issues in addition to other
forms of earnings manipulation.

31

References
Alfonso, E., C. S. Cheng and S. Pan (2013), ‘Income Classification Shifting and Mispricing of
Core Earnings.’ Working Paper (Louisiana State University).
Altman E. I. (1968), ‘Financial Ratios, Discriminate Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate
Bankruptcy.’ Journal of Finance 23 (4): 589-609.
Altman E. I. (2000), ‘Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and
ZETA Models.’ Working Paper (New York University).
Athanasakou, V., N. C. Strong and M. Walker (2009), ‘Earnings Management or Forecast
Guidance to Meet Analyst Expectations?’ Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 39,
pp. 3-35.
Athanasakou, V., N. C. Strong and M. Walker (2011), ‘The Market Reward for Achieving
Analyst Earnings Expectations: Does Managing Expectations or Earnings Matter?’
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 38, pp. 58-94.
Baber, W., P. Fairfield, and J. Haggard (1991), ‘The Effect of Concern About Reporting Income
on Discretionary Spending Decisions: The Case of Research and Development’, The
Accounting Review, Vol. 66, pp. 818-29.
Badertscher, B. (2011), ‘Overvaluation and the Choice of Alternative Earnings Management
Mechanisms’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 86, pp. 1491-518.
Barnea, A., J. Ronen and S. Sadan (1976), ‘Classificatory Smoothing of Income With
Extraordinary Items’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 51, pp. 110–22.
Barton, J. (2001), ‘Does the Use of Financial Derivatives Affect Earnings Management
Decisions?’ The Accounting Review, Vol. 76, pp. 1-26.
Barton, J. and P. Simko (2002), ‘The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint’,
The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, pp. 1-27.
Bartov, E. (1993), ‘The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation’, The Accounting
Review Vol. 68, pp. 840–55.
Barua, A., S. Lin, and A. M. Sbaraglia (2010), ‘Earnings Management Using Discontinued
Operations’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 85, pp. 1485-509.
Beattie, V., S. Brown, D. Ewers, B. John, S. Manson, D. Thomas and M. Turner (1994),
‘Extraordinary Items and Income Smoothing: A Positive Accounting Approach’, Journal
of Business Finance and Accounting Vol. 21, pp. 791–811.

32

Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K. Subramanyam (1998), ‘The Effect of Audit Quality
on Earnings Management’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.15, pp. 1-24.
Bell, T., F. Marrs, I. Solomon and H. Thomas (1997), ‘Auditing Organizations through a
Strategic-Systems Lens’, The KPMG Business Measurement Process, Retrieved from
http://www.business.illinois.edu/kpmg-uiuccases/monograph.pdf
Bhojraj, S., P. Hribar, M. Picconi and J. McInnis (2009), ‘Making Sense of Cents: An
Examination of Firms that Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts’, The Journal of
Finance, Vol. 64 (5), pp. 2361-88.
Burgstahler, D., J. Jiambalvo and T. Shevlin (2002), ‘Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect the
Implications of Special Items for Future Earnings?’ Journal of Accounting Research,
Vol. 40, pp. 585-612.
Bushee, B. (1998), ‘The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment
Behavior’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 73, pp. 305-33.
Chi, W., L. Lisic and M. Pevzner (2011), ‘Is Enhanced Audit Quality Associated with Greater
Real Earnings Management?’, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 25, pp. 315-35.
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey and T. Z. Lys (2008), ‘Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in
the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 83, pp. 757787.
Cohen, D., R. Mashruwala and T. Zach (2010), ‘The Use of Advertising Activities to Meet
Earnings Benchmarks: Evidence from Monthly Data’, Review of Accounting Studies,
Vol. 15, pp. 808-32.
Cohen, D. A. and P. Zarowin (2010), ‘Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities
around Seasoned Equity Offerings’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 50, pp.
2–19.
Dechow, P., W. Ge and C. Schrand (2010), ‘Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of
the Proxies, their Determinants and their Consequences’, Journal of Accounting and
Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 344-401.
Dechow, P. and C. Shakespeare (2009), ‘Do Managers Time Securitization Transactions for
Their Accounting Benefits?’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 84, pp. 99-132.
Dechow, P. and R. Sloan (1991), ‘Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An Empirical
Investigation’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 51-89.
DeFond, M. and J. Jiambalvo (1991), ‘Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting Errors’, The
Accounting Review, Vol.66, pp. 643-55.

33

DeFond, M. and J. Jiambalvo (1993), ‘Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements Over
Income-Increasing Accounting Methods’, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.9, pp.
415-31.
Ewert, R. and A. Wagenhofer (2005), ‘Economic Effects of Tightening Accounting Standards to
Restrict Earnings Management’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 80, pp. 1101-24.
Fairfield, P., R. Sweeney and T. Yohn (1996), ‘Accounting Classification and the Predictive
Content of Earnings’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 71, pp. 337-55.
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (1997), ‘Industry Costs of Equity’, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 153-93.
Fan, Y., A. Barua, W. M. Cready and W. B. Thomas (2010), ‘Managing Earnings through
Classification Shifting: Evidence from Quarterly Special Items’, The Accounting Review,
Vol. 85, pp. 1303-23.
Francis, J., E. Maydew and H. Sparks (1999), ‘The Role of Big Six Auditors in the Credible
Reporting of Accruals’, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol.18, pp. 17-35.
Gintschel, A. and S. Markov (2004), ‘The Effectiveness of Regulation FD’, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 293-314.
Graham, J, C. Harvey and S. Rajgopal (2005), ‘The Economic Implications of Corporate
Financial Reporting’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 3-73.
Haw, I.-M., S. S. M. Ho and A. Y. Li (2011), ‘Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
by Classification Shifting’ Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 28, pp. 517–53.
Healy, P. M. (1985), ‘The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions’, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 85-107.
Healy, P. M. and J. M. Wahlen (1999), ‘A Review of the Earnings Management Literature
and its Implications for Standard Setting’, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13, pp. 365-83.
Heflin, F. and C. Hsu (2008), ‘The Impact of the SEC’s Regulation of Non-GAAP Disclosures’,
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 349-65.
Herrmann, D., T. Inoue and W. B. Thomas (2003), ‘The Sale of Assets to Manage Earnings in
Japan’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 4, pp. 89-108.
Hirshleifer, D., K. Hou, S. H. Teoh and Y. Zhang (2004), ‘Do Investors Overvalue Firms with
Bloated Balance Sheets?’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 38, pp. 297-331.
Hribar, P., N. Jenkins and W. Johnson (2006), ‘Stock Repurchases as an Earnings Management
Device’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 3–27.

34

Jackson, S. and W. Wilcox. (2000), ‘Do Managers Grant Sales Price Reductions to Avoid Losses
and Declines in Earnings and Sales?’, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics,
Vol. 39 pp. 3-20.
Jones, J. (1991), ‘Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations’, Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol. 29, pp.193-228.
Kinney, M. and R. Trezevant (1997), ‘The Use of Special Items to Manage Earnings and
Perceptions’, The Journal of Financial Statement Analysis, Fall, pp. 45-53.
Lipe, R. (1986), ‘The Information Contained in the Components of Earnings’, Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol. 24, pp. 37-64.
McInnis, J. and D. W. Collins (2011), ‘The Effect of Cash Flow Forecasts on Accrual Quality
and Benchmark Beating’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 219–39.
McNichols, M. and G. Wilson (1988), ‘Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision
for Bad Debts’, Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, pp. 1-31.
McVay, S. E. (2006), ‘Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting: An Examination of
Core Earnings and Special Items’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, pp. 501-31.
Myers, J. N., L. A. Myers and T. C. Omer (2003), ‘Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client
Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?’, The
Accounting Review, Vol. 78, pp. 779-99.
Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliot and R. L. Tarpley (2002), ‘Evidence from Auditors about Managers’
and Auditors’ Earnings Management Decisions’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, pp.
175-202.
Pincus, M. and S. Rajgopal (2002), ‘The Interaction Between Accrual Management and
Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Firms’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 77 pp. 12760.
Roychowdhury, S. (2006), ‘Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation’,
Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 335-70.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2000), Proposed Rule 34-41987, Washington,
D.C.: SEC.
Shirato, K. and K. Nagata (2012), ‘Earnings Management through Classification Shifting under
Japanese GAAP’, Working Paper (Tokyo Institute of Technology).
Zang, A. Y. (2012), ‘Evidence on the Trade-Off Between Real Activities Manipulation and
Accrual-Based Earnings Management’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 87, pp. 675-703.

35

TABLE 1
Variable Definitions with Corresponding Compustat Codes
Variable
AEM

Definition
Accruals Earnings Management, calculated as the residual from modified Jones model:
Accrualst/ATt-1= β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(∆AdjSALESt/ATt-1) + β3(PPE/ATt-1) + β4(OpInct/ATt-1)
+ β5(∆OpCFt/ATt-1) + β6Neg∆OpCFt + β7(∆OpCFt/ATt-1)*Neg∆OpCFt+ εi,t.
Accruals is income before extraordinary items (IBC – (OANCF – XIDOC)); AT is total assets (AT);
∆AdjSALES is change in adjusted sales (SALEt – SALEt-1 – RECTt + RECT t-1); PPE is gross property,
plant and equipment (PPEGT); OpInc is operating income before depreciation (OIBDP); ∆OpCF is change
in operating cash flows (OANCF); Neg∆OpCF is indicator variable equal to one when ∆OpCF is negative.

BigN

Big N Auditor, which is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm is audited by a Big N audit firms
and zero otherwise.

CE

Core Earnings (before Special Items and Depreciation), calculated as (Sales - Cost of Goods Sold Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses) /Sales, where Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General,
and Administrative Expenses exclude Depreciation and Amortization, as determined by Compustat:
(OIBDP /SALE).

CFO_Forecast

Cash Flow from Operations Forecast, which is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm has cash
flow forecasts in IBES and zero otherwise.

CS

Classification Shifting firm, which is indicator variable equal to one when UnCE (from equation (1)) is
positive and IBES earnings per share is greater than GAAP net income per share (Athanasakou et al. 2011)
and zero otherwise.

HighNOAt

High Net Operating Assets, which is an indicator variable equal to one when beginning of the year NOA is
greater than the industry median; zero otherwise. NOA is shareholder’s equity less cash and marketable
securities plus total debt: NOA = (SEQ - CHE + DLTT + DLC) / SALE.

InstHoldings

Institutional Ownership, calculated as the number of shares held by institutions divided by total shares
outstanding.

Inverse_Mills

Inverse Mills ratio calculated from the following equation (Zang 2012):
JustBeatt = β0+β1NumberBeatt + β2Issuet+1 + β3MtBt-1 + β4Sharest + β5AFt + β6ROAt-1 + YearIndicators + εt
NumberBeat is number of times in the previous three years that firm met an earnings benchmark: analyst
forecast consensus, non-negative EPS or prior year EPS; Issue is indicator variable equal to 1 if firm issues
equity during fiscal year (CSHI > 0), and 0 otherwise; MtB is market to book ration calculated as natural
log of (market value of equity (PRCC_F * CSHO) divided by book value of equity (CEQ)); Shares is
natural log of the number of shares outstanding (CSHO); AF is natural log of the number of analysts
following the firm; ROA is return on assets calculated as net income scaled by total assets (NI / AT).

LogAssets

Log of Assets, calculated as log of total assets (AT).

LongTenuret

Long Tenured Auditor, which is an indicator variable equal to one when audit tenure is more than eight
years (sample median for audit tenure) and zero otherwise.

MarketShare

Firm’s percentage of its industry’s sales, calculated as the firm’s sales total divided by the industry (threedigit SIC code) sales total.

MtB

Natural log of the Market to Book ratio, which is a control variable for growth and calculated as log
(market value of equity (PRCC_F * CSHO) divided by book value of equity (CEQ)).

OpCycle

Operating Cycle, calculated as the days receivable plus days in inventory at the beginning of the year.

PredAEM

Predicted Accruals Earnings Management, calculated from the following equation (7) that regresses AEM
on REM constraints, AEM constraints, and control variables:
AEMt = β0 + β1TaxRatet-1 + β2Zscoret-1 + β3InstHoldingst-1 + β4MarketSharet-1 + β5BigNt

+ β6LongTenuret + β7HighNOAt + β8OpCyclet-1 + β9CFO_Forecastt + β10LogAssetst-1
+ β11ROAt-1 + β12MtBt + β13UnREMt + β14PredREMt + β15Inverse_Millst + εt.
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Table 1 (Continued)
PredREM

Predicted Real Earnings Management, calculated from the following equation (6) that regresses REM on
REM constraints, AEM constraints, and control variables:
REMt = β0 + β1TaxRatet-1 + β2Zscoret-1 + β3InstHoldingst-1 + β4MarketSharet-1 + β5BigNt

+ β6LongTenuret + β7HighNOAt + β8OpCyclet-1 + β9CFO_Forecastt + β10LogAssetst-1
+ β11ROAt-1 + β12MtBt + β13Earnt + β14Inverse_Millst + εt.
REM

Real Earnings Management; estimated from Roychowdhury (2006) regressions for discretionary expenses
and production costs. REMt = - equation (3) residual + equation (4) residual
DISEXPt= β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(Salest/ATt-1) +εt
(3)
PRODt = β0 + β1(1/ATt-1)+ β2(Salest/ATt-1)+ β3(∆Salest/ATt-1) + β4(∆Salest-1 /ATt-1)+εt

(4)

PRODt is production costs: Cost of goods sold (COGS) + change in inventory (INVTt –INVTt-1), scaled
by lagged assets (ATt-1); Salest is sales total (SALEt); ∆Salest is annual change in sales (SALEt - SALEt-1).

ROA

Return on Assets, which is calculated as net income (NI) divided by total assets (AT).

SOX

Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Period, which is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years after 2003 and
zero otherwise.

TaxRate

The firm’s tax rate, calculated as total taxes paid divided by pre-tax net income (TXT/PI) and constrained
to be between 0 and 100 percent.

UnAEM

Unexpected Accruals Earnings Management, calculated as the residual from the following equation (7)
that regresses AEM on REM constraints, AEM constraints, and control variables:
AEMt = β0 + β1TaxRatet-1 + β2Zscoret-1 + β3InstHoldingst-1 + β4MarketSharet-1 + β5BigNt

+ β6LongTenuret + β7HighNOAt + β8OpCyclet-1 + β9CFO_Forecastt + β10LogAssetst-1
+ β11ROAt-1 + β12MtBt + β13UnREMt + β14PredREMt + β15Inverse_Millst + εt.
UnCE

Unexpected Core Earnings is the difference between reported and predicted Core Earnings, where the
predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from model (1) estimated by fiscal year and industry as
follows:
CEt = β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3WCAt-1 + β4WCAt+ β5∆SALESt + β6NEG_ ∆SALESt + εt.
CE is Core Earnings, calculated as (Sales - Cost of Goods Sold - Selling, General, and Administrative
Expenses) /Sales (OIBDP /SALE). Note: Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General, and Administrative
Expenses exclude Depreciation and Amortization; ATO is Asset Turnover Ratio, defined as
SALEt/((NOAt+ NOAt-1) / 2). Net operating assets are required to be positive. NOA is shareholder’s equity
less cash and marketable securities plus total debt plus minority interests. NOA = (SEQ - CHE + DLTT +
DLC + MIB); WCA is Working capital accruals scaled by lagged assets, calculated as (change in total
current assets (ACT) net of change in cash (CHE), minus change in current liabilities (LCT) net of
change in the current portion of long-term debt (DLC)) / lagged total assets (AT); ∆Sales is percent
Change in Sales, calculated as (SALEt – SALEt-1) /SALEt-1; Neg_∆Sales is negative percent change in
sales, calculated as ∆SALESt if ∆SALESt is negative and zero otherwise.

UnREM

Unexpected Real Earnings Management, calculated as the residual from the following equation (6) that
regresses REM on REM constraints, AEM constraints, and control variables:
REMt = β0 + β1TaxRatet-1 + β2Zscoret-1 + β3InstHoldingst-1 + β4MarketSharet-1 + β5BigNt

+ β6LongTenuret + β7HighNOAt + β8OpCyclet-1 + β9CFO_Forecastt + β10LogAssetst-1
+ β11ROAt-1 + β12MtBt + β13Earnt + β15Inverse_Millst + εt.
Zscore

Altman’s Z-Score, calculated as modified version of Z-score (Altman 1968, 2000).
ZSCORE= 3.3 *(NI/AT) + 1.0 * (SALE/AT) + 1.4 * (RE/AT) + 1.2 * (WCAP/AT) + 0.6 * (CSHO *
PRCC_F /LT).
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics

Variable

N
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619
33,619

Mean
0.210
0.277
5.525
0.533
0.063
0.880
0.448
0.497
0.495
128.362
0.386
6.138
0.024
0.792
0.003
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.110

Standard
Deviation
0.408
0.187
6.623
0.297
0.135
0.325
0.497
0.500
0.500
80.183
0.487
1.915
0.149
0.763
0.230
0.041
0.284
0.069
0.241

25%
0.000
0.128
2.314
0.283
0.001
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
72.172
0.000
4.728
0.005
0.292
-0.117
-0.021
-0.135
-0.029
0.060

Median
0.000
0.330
3.791
0.553
0.008
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
113.374
0.000
5.973
0.050
0.755
0.009
0.000
0.004
0.001
0.121

75%
0.000
0.380
6.342
0.784
0.051
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
164.759
1.000
7.413
0.092
1.249
0.129
0.022
0.143
0.032
0.197

CSt
TaxRatet-1
Zscoret-1
InstHoldingst-1
MarketSharet-1
BigNt
LongTenuret
SOXt
HighNOAt-1
OpCyclet-1
CFO_Forecastt
LogAssetst-1
ROAt-1
MtBt
PredREMt
PredAEMt
UnREMt
UnAEMt
CEt
Notes:
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample, which covers the period 1988–
2011, and meets the sample selection criteria. Table 1 defines the variables.
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UnREMt

PredAEMt

PredREMt

MtBt

ROAt-1

LogAssetst-1

CFO_Forecastt

OpCyclet-1

HighNOAt-1

SOXt

LongTenuret

BigNt

MarketSharet-1

InstHoldingst-1

Zscoret-1

TaxRatet-1

CSt

TABLE 3
Pearson Correlation Matrix

-0.017
TaxRatet-1
-0.045 0.021
Zscoret-1
0.078 0.136 0.018
InstHoldingst-1
0.011 0.133 -0.097 0.129
MarketSharet-1
0.053 0.087 -0.021 0.172 0.114
BigNt
0.023 0.080 -0.068 0.213 0.160 0.200
LongTenuret
0.012 -0.107 -0.087 0.315 0.035 -0.162 0.070
SOXt
0.064 -0.016 -0.077 0.019 -0.014 -0.002 -0.010 0.002
HighNOAt-1
0.013 -0.106 0.060 -0.087 -0.096 -0.031 0.007 -0.103 0.199
OpCyclet-1
0.082 -0.002 -0.077 0.332 0.135 0.108 0.110 0.458 0.068 -0.131
CFO_Forecastt
0.132 0.153 -0.191 0.383 0.405 0.265 0.260 0.276 0.114 -0.147 0.544
LogAssetst-1
-0.059 0.346 0.257 0.161 0.102 0.039 0.104 0.023 -0.072 -0.121 0.093 0.192
ROAt-1
0.024 -0.035 0.262 0.075 0.029 0.055 0.012 -0.014 -0.157 -0.003 0.078 0.033 0.060
MtBt
-0.004 0.070 -0.206 -0.063 0.067 -0.104 -0.018 0.003 0.213 -0.145 -0.016 0.100 0.014 -0.407
PredREMt
-0.048 -0.079 -0.015 -0.094 0.002 -0.053 0.008 -0.019 -0.015 0.101 -0.049 -0.033 -0.031 -0.051 0.040
PredAEMt
-0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.211
UnREMt
-0.044 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000
UnAEMt
Notes:
Table 1 defines the variables. Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations among regression variables for full sample (33,619 firm-year observations) during the period
1988–2011 that meet the sample selection criteria. Amounts in bold are significant at the 0.05 level.
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TABLE 4
Logistic Analysis of the Probability of Classification Shifting Based on
Real and Accruals Earnings Management Constraints

Variable
Intercept
TaxRatet-1

(1)
Full Sample
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
-3.129***
(-17.85)
-0.0581
(-0.65)
-0.010***
(-3.38)
0.422***
(6.61)
-0.597***
(-3.77)
0.0713
(1.19)
-0.068**
(-2.05)
0.042
(0.31)
0.190***
(5.68)
0.000
(1.47)
0.177***
(4.19)
0.213***
(16.17)
-1.241***
(-10.94)
0.087***
(3.94)

Predicted Sign

+

Zscoret-1

+/-

InstHoldingst-1

+/-

MarketSharet-1

-

BigNt

+/-

LongTenuret

+/-

SOXt

+/-

HighNOAt-1

+

OpCyclet-1

-

CFO_Forecastt

+

LogAssetst-1
ROAt-1
MtBt
Inverse_Millst

(2)
Suspect Sample
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
-3.995***
(-4.68)
-0.07
(-0.40)
-0.012**
(-2.31)
0.325**
(2.32)
-0.971***
(-3.09)
-0.090
(-0.83)
-0.083
(-1.24)
0.086
(0.24)
0.167***
(2.57)
0.001**
(2.07)
0.175**
(2.08)
0.243***
(9.30)
-1.116***
(-4.84)
0.191**
(3.05)
0.456
(1.09)

Industry Indicator Variables
Yes
Yes
Year Indicator Variables
Yes
Yes
Log likelihood
-16,459.82
-3,733.48
Chi-square
1105.75
387.86
p-value
<.0001
<.0001
Correctly classified
65.0%
66.8%
Number of observations
33,619
7,638
Notes: Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2) for the sample firms:
(Prob CSt=1) =α0 + α1-4REM Constraints + α5-10AEM Constraints+α11-14Controls + εt
See Table 1 for variable definitions and calculations. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% percent, respectively. Significance tests are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign; and two-tailed
otherwise.
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TABLE 5
Logistic Analysis of the Probability of Classification Shifting Based on
Unexpected Real and Accruals Earnings Management

Variable
Intercept

(1)
Full Sample
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
-3.103***
(-17.50)
-0.266***
(-4.63)
-1.751***
(-8.32)
-0.072
(-0.81)
-0.012***
(-3.87)
0.393***
(6.15)
-0.547***
(-3.57)
0.038
(0.62)
-0.063*
(-1.88)
0.044
(0.33)
0.199***
(5.79)
0.000
(-1.30)
0.167***
(3.93)
0.221***
(16.82)
-1.210***
(-10.52)
0.050**
(2.05)
-0.242***
(-2.78)
-2.199***
(-5.76)

Predicted Sign

UnREMt

-

UnAEMt

-

TaxRatet-1

+

Zscoret-1

+/-

InstHoldingst-1

+/-

MarketSharet-1

-

BigNt

+/-

LongTenuret

+/-

SOXt

+/-

HighNOAt-1

+

OpCyclet-1

-

CFO_Forecastt

+

LogAssetst-1
ROAt-1
MtBt
PredREMt
PredAEMt
Inverse_Millst

Industry Indicator Variables
Year Indicator Variables
Log likelihood
Chi-square
p-value
Correctly classified
Number of observations

Yes
Yes
-16,375.10
1232.93
<.0001
65.8%
33,619
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(2)
Suspect Sample
Coefficient
(z-statistic)
-4.216***
(-4.81)
-0.541***
(-3.64)
-1.759***
(-2.57)
-0.078
(-0.44)
-0.014***
(-2.65)
0.297**
(2.10)
-0.879***
(-2.93)
-0.133
(-1.23)
-0.075
(-1.13)
0.070
(0.19)
0.202***
(3.03)
0.001*
(1.74)
0.166**
(1.96)
0.254***
(9.60)
-1.037***
(-4.46)
0.150**
(2.38)
-0.377***
(-3.20)
-2.065***
(-3.85)
0.640
(1.49)
Yes
Yes
-3,703.25
428.07
<.0001
68.0%
7,638

Table 5 (Continued)
Notes: Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (8) for the sample firms:
(Prob CSt=1) =α0 + α1UnREM + α2UnAEM +α3-6REM Constraints + α7-12AEM Constraints+α13-18Controls + εt
See Table 1 for variable definitions and calculations. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% percent, respectively. Significance tests are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign; and two-tailed
otherwise.
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